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The Congo crisis, the United 




The United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960–63 is a 
major chapter in African and Cold War history. The political consequences of the 
peacekeeping mission, particularly the use of UN troops against Moise Tshombe’s 
secessionist Katanga Province, reverberated in neighbouring African States as 
well. The contours of the UN’s role in the Congo crisis are well known, but this 
article will consider how UN intervention created a framework for the conflict 
between white minority rule and African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia. 
This article suggests that the intersection of Cold War politics and Southern 
African racial politics helped to create a situation in Southern Rhodesia in which 
white politicians felt threatened by the UN’s intervention, while Zimbabwean 
nationalists viewed cautiously the role of the UN as pan-African nationalism in 
the Congo became consumed by Cold War imperatives. The Katanga secession 
also demonstrated to both white politicians and Zimbabwean nationalists how 
intransigence and a small fighting force could challenge much more powerful 
nations in Cold War Africa.
*  Timothy Scarnecchia is Associate Professor of History at Kent State University, Kent, 
Ohio, USA. He is the author of The urban roots of democracy and political violence in 
Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940–1964 (University of Rochester Press, 2008).
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Introduction
The Congo crisis, as it took shape in 1960 and 1961, centred on the inability 
of the first elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, to retain control after 
the revolt of the army on 11 July 1960, and the mobilisation of large numbers 
of Belgian troops to defend Belgians in the Congo. The Katanga Province, the 
mineral-rich southern province dominated by Belgian mining interests, seceded 
on 12 July 1960 from the Congo, creating a major crisis for Lumumba. The 
United Nations moved swiftly in response to Lumumba’s immediate request 
for assistance, deploying on 15 July a large multinational peacekeeping force, 
the United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC), to assist Lumumba’s 
government contain the crisis and limit the potential for a larger conflict. In 
his statement to the Security Council on 8 August 1960, Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld clarified the purpose of UNOC to force the ‘complete withdrawal 
of the Belgian troops’ in order to protect the sovereignty of the Congo. He also 
argued that the UNOC mission was to guarantee that the democratic process 
would ‘be determined solely by the people of the Congo’. Hammarskjöld linked 
UNOC to another goal: ‘… finally, unanimity would be maintained, among 
Africans and non-Africans alike, here at the United Nations …’ (Cordier and 
Foote 1975:71). The importance of the Congo mission was therefore not only 
for the future of the Congo, but given the rapid growth of new African member 
states in the United Nations in 1960, UNOC was also a test of the impartiality of 
the institution.
By September 1960, the intrigues in the Congo’s capital of Leopoldville had 
pushed Lumumba’s army chief of staff, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who was advised 
and funded by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to carry out a 
coup that expelled the Soviets and Lumumba supporters from the capital. The 
Soviets continued to support Lumumba, however, while the Americans and the 
Belgians worked to ‘remove’ Lumumba permanently from Congolese politics. 
After Lumumba’s assassination in January of 1961, the United Nations, under 
intense criticisms from the Soviets for the handling of the Congo crisis, acted 
in February to strengthen UNOC’s mission by authorising the use of force in 
order to avoid civil war and to reunite all provinces into the former Congo. The 
message of Security Council Resolution 161 (1961) was that Katanga would 
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not be allowed to secede from the Republic and, if necessary, the UN would use 
force to push the Belgians out of Katanga. The Soviets, in the meantime, had 
been supporting Lumumba’s group, now led by Antoine Gizenga in Stanleyville 
in eastern Congo, and the balance of power in the conflict meant that in order 
to prevent a war between Katanga and the forces in Stanleyville, the UN forces 
would have to act in Katanga. They did this in August-December 1961, and the 
use of force brought Katanga’s leader Moise Tshombe to negotiate, although the 
end of Katanga’s secession would not come until 15 January 1963. 
The historical literature on the Congo crisis is quite large and recent works have 
done an excellent job of reconstructing the diplomatic relations around the crisis 
(Kent 2010; Namikas 2002), including the role of the Central African Federation 
(CAF) in supporting Katanga (Hughes 2003; Stapleton 2009). This article 
addresses the relationship of the Congo crisis to the Rhodesian crisis occurring 
at the same time but from the perspective of Southern African interests. Before 
examining the impact of the Congo crisis on Zimbabwean nationalists’1 view 
of the United Nations, it is useful to explore how CAF Prime Minister Sir Roy 
Welensky’s support for Moise Tshombe’s Katanga created a specifically Southern 
Rhodesian interpretation of the Congo crisis and the role of the UN there.
Strange bedfellows: Tshombe and Welensky 
From the point of view of white politicians in Southern Africa, the 1961 UN 
military operations against the Belgians and white mercenaries (including many 
Rhodesians and South Africans) defending Katanga in late August and mid-
September were seen as a sacrifice of Western economic interests – control of the 
Katanga’s mining resources – in return for Soviet support of a negotiated end to 
the civil war. If the UN could force Katanga back into the Central government, it 
was argued, the Soviets would stop their support of Antoine Gizenga’s secessionist 
government in Stanleyville and therefore avoid ‘another Korea’ in central Africa. 
The open support of Katanga by the CAF Prime Minister Welensky and the 
1 In this article the term ‘Zimbabwean nationalists’ represents African politicians seeking 
to obtain majority rule in Southern Rhodesia, and therefore is distinct from Southern 
Rhodesian white politicians – although there was a small minority of the latter in support 
of the former in this period.
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South Africans stood in the way of United States (US), Soviet, and UN goals. One 
possible outcome of the UN’s fighting with Katanga was continued intransigence 
on the part of Tshombe and the creation of a new political federation including 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, and Katanga. In the Cold War 
context of 1960–61, this new coalition of settler states and a new illegal but 
wealthy pro-Western African ‘state’ was not out of the question. In the midst of 
this showdown, it was the death of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 
18 September 1961 that forced Welensky’s CAF and the South Africans to back 
away from a more hardline position on Katanga (O’Brien 1962:4).
Sir Roy Welensky and other Southern African white politicians who supported 
Tshombe rationalised this support by arguing they were creating a ‘buffer’ state 
in Katanga that could protect them from the growing influence of the Soviet 
Union in Africa. They also believed the British and Americans would support 
Katanga should the conflict in the Congo come down to a Cold War conflict. 
In 1960, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) member states supported 
Belgian military defence of Katanga, and Welensky believed that CAF support 
was in line with Western interests. In early 1960, the CIA was suggesting the need 
to purchase an estimated ‘1500 tons of uranium-oxide’ stockpiled in Katanga as 
a precautionary measure to prevent it falling into Soviet control (Department 
of State, U.S. 1992:516). This made the support for UN efforts in Katanga a 
difficult one for the US and the British in particular, and both were unwilling 
to fully support the UN’s military efforts until they were convinced that the 
Congolese central government was sufficiently pro-Western. However, as all 
the pieces began to fall in place for a reunited Congolese government in August 
1961, Welensky’s continued support of Tshombe stood in the way and became 
an embarrassment for Western interests. As Namikas argues, Secretary-General 
Hammarskjöld gambled that the use of force against Katanga would work to 
galvanise American support for the UN mission. Hammarskjöld’s personal role 
in Katanga negotiations with Tshombe would, however, ultimately lead to his 
death (Namikas 2002:350). After his death, Hammarskjöld’s strategy succeeded 
with the Americans and the British supplying the necessary military support and 
transport for the UNOC operations in Katanga to go ahead.  
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An interesting source of information about Welensky’s and South Africa’s role 
in Katanga is found in the South African archives in a series of reports from 
the South African High Commissioner in Salisbury to the Minister of External 
Affairs in Pretoria. The South African High Commissioner, H.K.T. Taswell, 
became a strong advocate for South African assistance to Katanga – including 
clandestine military aid through the Federation – and of Welensky’s reasoning 
that such support would ultimately help South Africa and Southern Rhodesia 
overcome their international isolation brought on by internal political violence 
in 1960. These official sources offer a unique view of the way the defence of 
Katanga helped shape white Southern African views of their future role in what 
they viewed as a common defence against communist and ‘Afro-Asiatic’ control 
of Africa through the United Nations. 
Before the Katanga secession, South African High Commissioner Taswell had 
sent glowing reports to the Minister of External Affairs about Welensky’s tough 
language for the British. On 18 March 1960, Taswell reported the ‘growing 
discontent’ among white politicians ‘with United Kingdom policy in Africa and 
deep concern at the apparent readiness of the British Government to sacrifice 
the White people in Southern Africa to black extremism’ (Taswell 1960:1). 
Taswell reported how Welensky continued to attack the Colonial Office, and how 
Welensky ‘strongly resented being referred to as a settler’ and claimed that he was 
a ‘“White African”’. Taswell then suggests that Welensky’s message forced British 
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to soften the language used to describe whites 
in the CAF. Macmillan is reported to have said in a televised interview, ‘that the 
problems in the Federation are totally different and that “Hundreds of thousands 
of our own people live there. They have their rights too. They brought wealth 
and civilization to darkest Africa. Can’t we approach the whole matter with a 
little humility, and preferably some knowledge of the facts?”’ Taswell suggested, 
‘Perhaps the winds of change in Africa are beginning to blow in the direction 
of London, too’ (Taswell 1960:2). According to historian Tom Noer, the reports 
of violence against whites in the Congo did in fact help the political cause of 
those who claimed independence in sub-Saharan Africa had been ‘premature’, 
‘… and gave new credence to the claims of Lisbon, Salisbury, and Pretoria that 
they were the only safeguards against violence, tribal warfare, and radicalism’ 
(Noer 1985:57; cf. Dunn 2003).
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In early 1961, following Lumumba’s assassination at the hands of Belgian and 
Katanga forces and with the British signalling that the CAF could be scrapped 
in order to make way for African rule in Zambia and Malawi, Taswell remained 
a strong believer in Welensky and made the case that Sir Roy was defending 
whites in Southern Africa against the growing ‘selling out’ of white interests by 
the British, the Americans, and the United Nations. Taswell (1961b:1) wrote 
disparagingly of the British:
The British Government’s policy is strongly in favour of giving much 
more say to the black man. But whereas United Federal Party policy is 
essentially a long term go-slow one with no intention of handing over 
to extremists, the United Kingdom favours a rapid hand-over-now 
approach. One cannot but detect in United Kingdom policy a feeling 
of apathy towards the white man in Africa and a strong desire to rid 
Britain of its overseas colonial responsibilities as quickly as possible. 
Events in the Congo continued to fulfil fears among politicians in Southern 
Africa that they were being abandoned and betrayed for Cold War interests. 
Following Lumumba’s assassination in January 1961, the 21 February UN 
Security Council Resolution 161, which authorised the use of force in Katanga 
as a pre-emptive measure to prevent a civil war in the Congo, increased the 
sense that the Americans, British, and the UN were now willing to sacrifice the 
interests of whites in Southern Africa. This resolution confirmed the feeling 
among Rhodesian politicians that they were under siege from the international 
community – particularly Western forces that had previously been seen as their 
natural allies. 
Taswell’s letters also confirm that the CAF was supplying weapons and armoured 
steel to Tshombe’s forces. This was assumed by the British and the Americans, but 
apparently only confirmed by the British and communicated to the Americans 
by December 1961 (Hughes 2003:607; Kent 2010:79). Taswell reports that he had 
learned that ‘the Federal Government takes the view that Tshombe is fighting 
their battle for them and they have asked him to state what he wants from them 
in the way of military and other equipment’. Taswell requested that South Africa 
take seriously Tshombe’s requests, as such supplies could be shipped as mining 
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equipment and get past the UN troops with the CAF’s help. Taswell (1961a:3) 
made an appeal for South African aid using the following Cold War and race 
war logic:
If Tshombe fails, the drive to the south will be on. The Rhodesias, 
already in a shaky position, may collapse and we will be the main 
target. Whether or not we have been strictly correct in our supply of 
material to Tshombe will be of little consequence.
Taswell once again praised Welensky’s efforts to help Tshombe defy the UN, the 
Americans, and the Afro-Asian nations. 
Welensky apparently briefed Taswell on 12 October 1961 about his efforts to 
support Tshombe during the UN military operations. Welensky had summoned 
Tshombe to Salisbury to give him advice on how best to respond diplomatically 
after the UN’s use of force. Taswell describes Welensky’s account of his meeting 
with Tshombe: ‘While he does not always think too much of the black man as 
a statesman, Sir Roy said, he was greatly impressed with Tshombe’s ability and 
sincerity’. Welensky apparently told Tshombe that he couldn’t take on the whole 
Afro-Asian block on his own, particularly with India’s Nehru so committed to 
defeating Katanga. Welensky told Tshombe, ‘[t]he Katanga was the first setback 
the Afro-Asian bloc had suffered in Africa and it was therefore essential that 
he, Tshombe, should do all he could to capitalise on it. He must play his cards 
extremely well’ (Taswell 1961c:2). Most of Welensky’s advice was in fact followed 
by Tshombe – to move extremely slowly in negotiations with Congolese Prime 
Minister Cyrille Adoula in order to buy time to regroup militarily and then to 
bring Katanga back into the Republic only on terms that would allow Tshombe 
to survive politically.
Welensky also told Taswell that he was responsible for ending the UN’s military 
campaign. Sir Roy claims to have ‘delivered an ultimatum’ that ‘unless the United 
Kingdom took steps at once to check the United Nations he was ordering the 
RRAF [Royal Rhodesian Air Force] into action’. Claiming that his ultimatum 
worked, Welensky told Taswell, ‘While Tshombe and I could not have taken 
on the world we could have cleared up the U.N. bunch in no time. And that, 
“he smiled” would really have started something’ (Taswell1961c:2). Welensky’s 
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threats to use additional force were real. Dayal indicates that Lord Landsdowner, 
the British Under-Secretary of State, remarked in the British Parliament after 
returning from the Congo that he (Welensky) had threatened UN Secretary- 
General Hammarskjöld, insisting that he stop the fighting immediately, and that 
‘[t]here was also an implication that Tshombe would be supported militarily 
from Northern Rhodesia and the United Nations would get bogged down in a war 
of attrition which would effectively destroy the Organization’ (Dayal 1976:273). 
While such tough talk made Welensky popular with the South Africans, it hardly 
endeared him with the British and Americans. The British military went as far 
as planning a possible military action against the Rhodesian Royal Air Force 
because of Welensky’s intransigence over Katanga and the Federation (Murphy 
2006).
Reacting to UNOC’s Operation Mothar, Federation politicians spoke out in 
the Federal Parliament. Included in the more sensational responses was the 
then future Rhodesian Front Prime Minister, Winston Field, who ‘… accused 
the British Government for a vacillating policy “at the behest of their American 
masters.” He urged that a firm stand should be taken in support of Mr Tshombe 
whom he described as “a friend”’ (Central African Daily News 1961c). John 
Gaunt, who then represented Lusaka in the Federal Parliament but who would 
later plot against Winston Field to bring Ian Smith to power in the Rhodesian 
Front, argued for a state of emergency to be declared in the Federation. Gaunt 
said in Parliament, ‘“Legalities can be fixed later.… We have no time; we must act 
now,” he urged. Describing events in Katanga as “organised pillage”, he said the 
United Nations – an organization set up for peace – had now become a band of 
mercenaries. “We must resist them”’ (Central African Daily News 1961c).
The impact of the UN and the Congo crisis on Zimbabwean 
African nationalism 
As events in 1961 unfolded, including the assassination of Congolese Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba by the Belgian and Katanga forces in February 
1961, it became increasingly clear that the Congo presented opportunities for 
Zimbabwean nationalists to position themselves for financial and military 
support from Cold War interests. Both the Soviets and the Americans attempted 
The Congo crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960–1963
71
to influence the Zimbabwean nationalist movement, and in the early 1960s this 
primarily meant providing financial assistance to the nationalists and trade unions. 
The Congo crisis provided some leverage for Zimbabwean nationalists to make their 
case for Cold War support. Vladimir Shubin, in his history of the Soviets in Southern 
Africa, describes how the Zimbabwean National Democratic Party (NDP) received 
financial assistance in 1960 from the Soviets, not only because they were seen as ‘“… 
the most progressive and mass party”’, but also because George Silundika, the NDP’s 
representative, had convinced the Soviets that the NDP ‘“… is conducting certain 
work in the province of Katanga against the government of Tshombe in defense of 
the lawful Congolese government of P. Lumumba”’ (Shubin 2008:152). American 
sources were also providing funds to anti-communist trade unionists, and then in 
1961 directly to the nationalists, in hopes of keeping the nationalists from Soviet 
influence. 
On 11 October 1960, Zimbabwean leader Joshua Nkomo made an appeal at the 
UN for Security Council intervention three months after the Congo crisis had 
begun and two months after rioting and protests in Southern Rhodesia in 1960. 
These riots in Salisbury, Bulawayo, and Gwelo were the first time since the late 19th 
century that Rhodesian police had opened fire on Africans, and Nkomo’s speech 
attempted to indicate the growing sense that the State was now using deadly force 
as had happened in South Africa, South West Africa, and the Portuguese colonies in 
1960. Nkomo’s goal was to push the United Nations to force the British to intervene:
… There will be no peace in Southern Rhodesia unless the British 
Government intervenes at this stage and accedes to African demands of 
a constitutional conference failing which the Africans shall press forth 
for an immediate suspension of the constitution of the country, so as 
to give time for the drafting of a constitution that will give power to the 
people and not to a minority section (Nkomo 1960).2
2 Andrew DeRoche has written extensively on the US relations with Central Africa during the 
Cold War. DeRoche highlighted the warning of the US Consul-General in Salisbury, which 
echoes Nkomo’s concerns. Following the July 1960 riots in Bulawayo and Salisbury and the 
Sharpeville massacre in April 1960 in South Africa, ‘Palmer believed that only fundamental 
political reform instigated by Great Britain combined with significant financial aid from 
the United States could guarantee stability in the region. Otherwise, the Federation could 
conceivably descend into chaos resembling that in the Congo’ (DeRoche 2001:36). 
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If the UN did not intervene, he predicted the beginning of a race war and claimed 
that the UN needed to act quickly, or else ‘… the U.N. will have failed millions 
of dependent people who are looking up to it for their hope for the security and 
peace for which they gave their lives in the last two wars’. He ended his statement 
by pointing out, ‘… white settlers in Central Africa and in Southern Rhodesia 
in particular are arming themselves against the African people, and they have 
gone as far as recruiting white South Africans to assist them in their pending war 
against Africans’. When placed in the context of the Congo crisis and the UN’s 
very ambitious commitment to bringing it to an end, Nkomo’s strategy was part 
of a diplomatic effort to compare the ‘chaos’ in Southern Rhodesia as similar to 
the rationale used to secure UN intervention in the Congo.
Joshua Nkomo’s 1960 attempt to direct the UN Security Council’s attention to the 
State-sponsored violence in Southern Rhodesia failed to elicit Security Council 
action. All subsequent appeals would have the same result. While numerous 
General Assembly resolutions were passed to try and push the British to take 
responsibility for the situation in Rhodesia, these were symbolic with little real 
force behind them. The relative weight of the Southern Rhodesian crisis, in Cold 
War terms, was far less than that of the Congo crisis. It can be argued, however, 
that the Congo crisis and the divisiveness of Tshombe’s Katanga, would offer an 
important framework upon which the Zimbabwean nationalists constructed 
their strategies in these years. 
The strongest criticisms of the UN and the US came after 13 February 1961 
as the official news of Patrice Lumumba’s assassination reached Salisbury. The 
American Consul-General, John K. Emmerson, who had served in Japan during 
World War II and been an American emissary to the Chinese Communist Party in 
1946, expressed concern over the ‘venom being directed against the US’ from even 
Herbert Chitepo, who he described as a ‘pro US-Southern Rhodesian lawyer’. 
Chitepo and others were blaming the US ‘for failure [to] support Lumumba 
and for UN failure in the Congo’. The most vocal criticism of the UN and US 
came from George Silundika, the NDP’s Cairo representative, who Emmerson 
describes as having ‘saturated’ himself with the Communist line. In Emmerson’s 
opinion, the ‘African nationalist movement here could now take on new red-hued 
complexion’ (Emmerson 1961a). Josiah Chinamano, an important nationalist 
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leader who was employed at the time by the US Consul-General, reported an 
interview with Silundika on 17 February, in which Silundika ‘… claimed that the 
Americans are “very cunning”; in other parts of Africa, particularly in the Congo, 
they have “bought” a number of African leaders and the NDP would have to be 
very careful to see that none of its officials were so bought’. Chinamano concluded 
that Silundika had been ‘deeply contaminated during his stay in Cairo and his 
visit behind the Iron Curtain’. Chinamano noted, on what was to be his last day 
working for the Americans, that Silundika’s anti-American argument marked ‘… 
the stage where we can identify for the first time the forerunner of the Soviet 
effort to penetrate the nationalist movement in the Colony. Things will never be 
the same’ (Emmerson 1961b). The Lumumba assassination helped to galvanise 
a nationalist identity in Central Africa based on an anti-imperialist message. 
While many of the Zimbabwean nationalists continued to work closely with the 
Americans, and in fact would receive financial support from the Americans to 
build up their opposition to minority rule, they could not help but take advantage 
of the organising opportunity offered by Lumumba’s assassination. Here was a 
Cold War intervention that showed the price nationalists would pay should they 
go against Western interests. Silundika and Enos Nkala organised seven NDP 
meetings in all the major urban areas in Southern Rhodesia to attack the US 
for Lumumba’s death. Nkala even went as far as to reportedly say at the rallies 
that when the NDP gains power, the Consul-General and his staff would be ‘sent 
packing’ (Mulcahy 1961). The stage was therefore set to attack Zimbabwean 
nationalists with open ties to American funding.
Six months later, Zimbabwean nationalists’ reactions to the UN’s active military 
role in Katanga beginning in August 1961were more cautious than their response 
had been to Lumumba’s assassination. Stanlake Samkange noted that if it were true 
that Welensky and the Federal government were providing assistance to Katanga, 
such actions would legitimatise the intervention of the Congo government in 
affairs of the Federation, leading to a potential border war (Samkange 1961). 
George Silundika reportedly sent a cable to the UNIP leadership the day after 
Operation Mothar began, ‘urging them to see that the N. Rhodesia-Katanga 
border is searched for any fugitives, including Mr Tshombe and Mr Munongo 
...’ and to ‘… see that that no Katanga political refugee is allowed into Northern 
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Rhodesia’ (Central African Daily News 1961c). The African press was also 
cautious in their response to UNOC military actions in Katanga since they could 
not condone intervention to put down a secession, as it was well known that 
Dr Hastings Banda, the nationalist leader in Nyasaland, was threatening to secede 
from the CAF. 
There were stronger public criticisms following the death of UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjöld on 18 September 1961 as part of his personal 
diplomacy to end the Katanga secession. A joint statement issued by Joshua 
Nkomo and Kenneth Kaunda, the ‘Zambezi Declaration’ of 22 September 1961, 
called for majority rule in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. Coming four 
days following Hammarskjöld’s death, the Zambezi Declaration commented on 
the incident, as the Central African Daily News (1961d:1) reports:
The joint statement blames the death of Mr Dag Hammarsjoeld [sic] 
on international intrigue and conspiracy which also led to the death 
of Mr Patrice Lumumba. It views with grave concern the interference 
in the internal affairs of the Congo by the British Government, the 
imposed Federal Government, and the Verwoerd Government. ‘In 
S. Rhodesia African people have been killed for calling for majority 
rule; in N. Rhodesia some are dying now; and thousands of our 
followers languish in detention camps and prisons. Yet’, it charges, 
‘these perpetrators of political crime against humanity are arming 
Tshombe to the tooth to fight his way out of the Congo Republic – 
not because they like Tshombe, but because they want to extend the 
hold of colonialism and imperialism’. 
By October 1961, the UN’s campaign against foreign mercenaries in Katanga 
drew stark lines among regional leaders. On the one hand, Welensky continued 
to publicly deny any involvement. The American Consulate-General’s office 
telegrammed to Washington Welensky’s 10 October press conference where 
Welensky claimed the ‘GNR [Government of Northern Rhodesia] has always 
maintained strictest neutrality RE use [of] force in Congo and taken “considerable 
pains” [to] prevent arms and military equipment [from] crossing border. GNR 
also has refused [to] let such traffic pass through its territory’ (Emmerson 
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1961c).3 On the other hand, the hatred of Tshombe helped to forge closer ties 
between Nkomo, Kaunda, and Dr Hastings Banda in Nyasaland. For Central 
African nationalists, therefore, the key events and personalities of the Congo 
began to take a life of their own as they hoped to bring international attention 
to the real crisis in the Rhodesias, not just in the Congo. The combination of 
international lobbying and internal factionalism led Zimbabwean nationalists to 
adopt the language, and even the logic, of the Congo crisis for their own struggle.
The primary form of this was the use of Tshombe as the archetype of the ‘sellout’ 
politician, while the martyred Lumumba became the archetype of the pure pan-
Africanist. The increasingly oppressive Rhodesian state during the early 1960s, 
particularly given the voting into power by a minority electorate of the extremist 
Rhodesian Front in 1962, meant that hopes of negotiated majority rule decreased 
over time. Faced with white political intransigence and repression, the nationalist 
movement turned to creating popular opposition to the Rhodesian state through 
general strikes and acts of violence and sabotage. In 1961, when Joshua Nkomo 
was told by the British that Southern Rhodesia’s industry and economy were 
too important to turn over to Africans, Nkomo vowed to ‘destroy’ Southern 
Rhodesia’s industry and make the country ungovernable. The Rhodesian state 
responded with more arrests and detentions and the banning of the NDP. 
By May of 1962, Nkomo and others in the Zimbabwe African People’s Union 
(ZAPU) – which had been formed in December 1961 to replace the banned NDP 
– were calling for a general strike to create ‘chaos’ in Southern Rhodesia. Part of 
the motivation for this general strike was to help put Southern Rhodesia on the 
agenda of the UN General Assembly’s special session in June (Geren 1962). The 
strike was largely a failure, resulting in the arrests of more nationalists and for 
3 Welensky’s capacity to maintain a lie continued with his 25 October statement where 
he described the allegations from the UN that he was supplying Tshombe’s troops with 
materials as ‘irresponsible hysteria’. Welensky stated, ‘“Let me say again in simplest terms 
that the Federal government has not supplied military equipment or mercenaries to the 
Katanga forces”’. He concluded, ‘“I recognize, however, that denials by me will have little 
effect on such people and that baseless and quite unsubstantiated rumours about Federal 
actions will continue to be quoted as the truth by those who subscribe only too obviously 
to the Nazi doctrine that the truth does not matter in world affairs; what counts is only 
what lies you can get away with”’ (Emmerson 1961d).
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the first time, the firing of thousands of African workers who participated in the 
strike. The use of general strikes to gain the attention of the United Nations in 
1962 was one part of a larger divide in the nationalist movement, one that had to 
do with the continued independence of the African trade union movement from 
ZAPU control.
The main target of the NDP and then ZAPU was the leader of the Southern 
Rhodesian Trade Union Congress (SRTUC), Rueben Jamela. Jamela had 
previously risen to the leadership role of the SRTUC after Joshua Nkomo and 
others had taken leadership roles in the nationalist movement. Jamela had helped 
form the nationalist movement and saw himself as a nationalist, but he defended 
the independence of the SRTUC from the nationalists because he believed if they 
were to fall under one leadership, the Rhodesian state would ban the SRTUC. With 
30 000 members, the SRTUC would be unable to continue working for African 
workers and the nationalist movement. Throughout 1961 and 1962, George 
Silundika and Robert Mugabe were the most vocal critics of Jamela’s American 
and European funding. Making matters worse, Jamela jealously guarded his 
financial ties to American and European trade union funding (Scarnecchia 
2008:111–116). 
As Jamela refused to relinquish control of the SRTUC to ZAPU, a rival African 
trade union was formed by ZAPU to pull members and international funding 
away from Jamela. This new African Trade Union Congress (ATUC) attacked 
Jamela in the main rhetorical form available, as a sellout. The ATUC’s ‘Personal 
Letter to Jamela’, published in the Workers Voice of March 1962, indicates how 
much of the then recent events in the Congo shaped the political language within 
the Zimbabwean nationalist movement. The letter first compared Jamela to 
the failed Northern Rhodesian nationalist Harry Nkumbula who had accepted 
funding and vehicles from Tshombe (see Macola 2010:86). The letter warned 
Jamela, ‘Your sell-outism is known by all the workers it does not matter how many 
cars you may buy’. The letter then commented on a speech Jamela had made to 
workers and responded to the possibility that Jamela would start a competing 
African political party.
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You said to them according to what you understand that political 
freedom in Zimbabwe cannot be won by politicians but by trade 
unionists when you gave an example of the Congo where Lumumba 
the son of African [sic], you said failed and that because Adoula who 
is former trade unionist has got the reigns of Government the Congo 
not going to fail, in any way? Do you think you the Adoula? We can 
assure you that you will never put your foot in parliament on the 
ticket of the workers the African but on the ticket of your own political 
bosses...Why don’t you come to your senses and realise things. We 
won’t support a sell out of your type (Workers Voice 1962:7).
The ATUC was less successful in organising the May 1962 General strike, and this 
helped Jamela regroup. Soon after, however, as the war of words and the sellout 
accusations turned into deadly battles between his supporters and ZAPU, Jamela 
fell out of favour with his American and European supporters. Geren notes that 
by early 1963 Jamela’s ‘standing among Africans’ was regarded ‘as having fallen 
to a level only slightly higher than that of Tshombe’ (Geren 1963a). The ZAPU 
leadership succeeded in weakening Jamela’s power over both a large rank and file 
membership and international funding. In 1963, however, this process would be 
repeated within ZAPU itself as a leadership split led to the breakaway formation 
of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) by August 1963. 
The ZANU-ZAPU split also demonstrated the use of Congo-related rhetoric as 
both parties claimed to be the true pan-Africanist organisation in the tradition 
of Lumumba, while portraying the other party as Tshombe’s – those who would 
sell out Zimbabwe to the highest bidder. Again, both ZAPU and ZANU were 
receiving financial support from numerous sources, ZAPU from the Soviets and 
the Americans, and ZANU from the Chinese and the Americans. Joshua Nkomo 
and those who remained with ZAPU immediately charged that ZANU was an 
American-inspired splinter group created with assistance of the US Ambassador 
in Tanzania, William Leonhart. ZAPU leaders such as Nkomo, Reverend 
Ndabaningi Sithole, Herbert Chitepo and others had been to Washington DC 
and New York City to raise funds for ZAPU from American mining companies 
while also petitioning at the United Nations. After August 1963, Reverend Sithole, 
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Chitepo, and Robert Mugabe were leading ZANU and Nkomo carried on as leader 
of ZAPU, and both parties continued to request and receive American funding, 
mostly in the form of direct contributions from mining companies. Nkomo 
expressed his concerns that Sithole and ZANU would use American funding to 
‘sellout’ the country’s resources, and invoked afresh the memory of Lumumba’s 
death in a speech he gave at Fort Victoria a month after the ZAPU-ZANU split. 
A newspaper account records that
Nkomo said the United States will ‘help us get the whites out’ but 
with the aim afterwards of exploiting the country’s mineral resources. 
Nkomo said that while he was in New York a few months ago he 
had visited the offices of an American mining company engaged in 
operations in Rhodesia. Nkomo said, ‘The minerals are here, but so 
is the cheap labor…Patrice Lumumba died because he refused to sell 
the Congo to America…’ Nkomo added, ‘It does not matter about 
Sithole or Nkomo; but who is going to get our country back and not 
sell it to someone else.’ He asked the crowd if they wanted money 
from Britain, America or Russia, to which the crowd roared: ‘No’ 
(Geren1963c).4
The American Consul-General, Paul Geren, asked ZAPU’s publicity secretary, 
Willie Musururwa, whether or not this was what Nkomo had said. Musururwa 
claimed it had been taken out of context but, added that ‘Fort Victoria has been 
the scene of the Sithole group’s [ZANU’s] greatest success to date, and it thus 
was not surprising that Nkomo would pull out the stops on the United States, 
to whom he has branded Sithole a “sellout”’. The Americans tried their best to 
give support to both ZAPU and ZANU after the split, but it proved increasingly 
difficult to justify in light of the anti-American rhetoric both sides used to 
gain support – given the Tshombe-Lumumba rhetoric already in place before 
the split. 
In September 1963, American Consul-General Paul Geren asked ZANU leader 
Ndabaningi Sithole to comment on an anti-American statement made in China 
4 Ellipses in original.
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by ZANU’s representative Tranos Makombe.5 Sithole responded by saying it was 
difficult for him and others in ZANU, who the US viewed as ‘safe’ given their 
pro-American views, to receive as much funding from the Americans compared 
to those who were more likely to be supported by the Soviets (in this context, 
ZAPU). Sithole told Geren that ‘Officers in the Department of State talk big and 
with encouragement but when it comes to acting to help a cause like Sithole’s 
they cannot deliver’. Sithole also criticised the US for choosing to abstain at the 
UN on votes that were designed to force the British to take more responsibility for 
bringing majority rule to Rhodesia. Sithole remarked, 
Africans observe that the Soviet Union supported Southern 
Rhodesia’s case at the Security Council and in the General Assembly 
while the United States merely abstains. The African public concludes 
from this that the United States does not in fact support the Southern 
Rhodesian nationalists while the Soviets and the communists do 
support them (Geren 1963d).
An American diplomat at the meeting told Sithole ‘… that threats of communist 
blackmail are not a successful method for winning American friends nor 
assistance from the United States government’. Geren then explained that the US 
abstentions at the Security Council did not mean the US was ‘against Southern 
Rhodesian nationalists rather it meant that we saw no good purpose to be served 
by the resolution. … our action must be of a kind calculated to encourage the 
most helpful response from the UK’ (Geren 1963d).
American Consul-General Geren was closer to Robert Mugabe than to Sithole. 
Geren had travelled to Dar es Salaam to meet with Mugabe a few days after Sithole 
and Mugabe formerly launched ZANU. Geren noted that Mugabe’s views of the 
usefulness of the United Nations had changed after the split, given that Nkomo 
5 Makombe reportedly had said on Chinese radio: ‘“To all oppressed people, the Chinese 
revolution offers the best example of how to struggle against imperialism and colonialism 
and for national liberation…An example of this is the recent statement by Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung condemning racial discrimination against Negroes in America. The Chinese 
people are also firmly opposed to imperialism and modern revisionism”’ (Geren 1963d). 
Ellipse in original.
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and George Silundika had made very good use of the UN for ZAPU’s recognition, 
and ZANU had yet to be recognised there. Geren observed:
Mugabe considers there is little point in additional UN resolutions 
on Southern Rhodesia. So far as the Security Council is concerned, 
Mugabe said: ‘Southern Rhodesia is not a threat to world peace. In 
fact there is no threat to the internal security of Southern Rhodesia’ 
(Geren1963b).
Mugabe’s attitude toward the UN apparently changed a few months later 
after having had the opportunity to go to New York City. Returning to Dar es 
Salaam in November 1963, Mugabe told US Ambassador William Leonhart that 
ZANU needed assistance in financing a permanent representative in New York, 
which Mugabe called the ‘“single most important location in the world”’. It was 
Tanzanian politician Oscar Kambona who organised and accompanied Mugabe 
on his first trip to the UN in order to counter ZAPU’s representative, George 
Silundika (Leonhart 1963).
Even though Mugabe was excited about having a ZANU representative at the 
UN, he remained cautious about the potential influence the UN could have on 
Southern Rhodesia. Mugabe told Leonhart that little was likely to come from the 
UN or the Secretary-General’s ‘good offices’. Mugabe thought that both the British 
Government and the Rhodesian Front Government were ‘too mistrustful of UN 
initiatives in Africa and would not wish [to] see [the] UN receive any credit for 
S[outhern]R[hodesia] progress’ (Leonhart 1963). Despite the efforts of Ghana’s 
Kwame Nkrumah to force a Security Council Resolution requiring the British 
to block the turning over of the CAF’s military to Southern Rhodesia in 1963, 
the UN failed to push Britain to take more immediate action on the Rhodesian 
crisis (Hubbard 2011:348). If anything, the series of General Assembly resolutions 
passed to pressure Britain to take a stronger stance on Rhodesia majority rule 
helped to galvanise white minority rule and justify stronger measures against 
the nationalists. As Frank Clements observed, resolutions such as Resolution 
1760 (XVII) (31 October 1962) calling for the British to suspend the Southern 
Rhodesian constitution and immediately grant majority rule, helped to build 
up resistance to outside pressures within white politics. ‘Britain would find that 
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they [Rhodesians] could be just as threatening and just as defiant as any black 
nationalists’ (Clements 1969:187). In this sense, the Katanga experience had 
shown how a small minority with control over the police and military could 
survive the onslaught of UN opinion. This lesson was not lost on either side of 
the Rhodesian conflict.
Conclusion
The Congo crisis helped to shape the rhetoric and intransigence of African 
nationalism in Southern Rhodesia. It also helped shape the relationships of 
African nationalists toward Cold War and mining interests in the region. The 
historical contingency of having such a major Cold War conflict occurring at 
the same time as the Zimbabwean nationalists struggled with Rhodesian state 
repression meant that Zimbabwean nationalists could turn to American, Soviet, 
and Chinese financial assistance. Not one of these powers, however, viewed 
Southern Rhodesia as strategically important relative to the ongoing Congo 
conflict. The role of Federation Prime Minister Sir Roy Welensky in publicly 
supporting Moise Tshombe in the Katanga hurt the reputation of the Federation 
but this was countered by the perception in the United States and elsewhere 
that the violence in the Congo originated in African ‘chaos’ and not from the 
myriad external interests competing over the Congo’s strategic resources. 
Equally important, the continued Anglo-American alliance guaranteed that the 
United States was not going to vote against the UK at the UN over Rhodesia 
(Hubbard 2011).
The largest impact of the Congo conflict, particularly the Western power’s role 
in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and support for Mobutu and Tshombe, 
was on internal Zimbabwean nationalist competition. The deployment of 
‘sellout’ politics, which at one level paralleled white political views of Western 
interests in the region, worked to give a rhetorical edge to those who could make 
greater claims to an authentic pan-African position. The debate over pan-African 
authenticity made more sense when fashioned as a choice between the ‘Tshombes’ 
and the ‘Lumumbas’ in the struggle. In shaping this debate, the contradictions of 
nationalists and trade unionists seeking funding from all sides of the Cold War 
were more or less resolved through a violent code of conformity. What couldn’t 
82
Timothy Scarnecchia The Congo crisis, the United Nations, and Zimbabwean nationalism, 1960–1963
be debated at the level of ideology or strategy was decided through factional 
violence. There is some indication that in the early years, at least, Nkomo 
and others hoped to mobilise strikes and riots to gain the attention of the 
United Nations in hopes that the Security Council would intervene. When 
the prospects for intervention seemed less likely, the United Nations became 
viewed more as an important site of legitimation for different nationalists 
rather than as an institution that was likely to intervene on the behalf of the 
nationalists. 
What then was the legacy of the UN’s intervention in the Congo in 1960–61 
for Southern Rhodesia and the Zimbabwean nationalists? Most importantly, 
Sir Roy Welensky’s over-confident view that the CAF could, with South Africa’s 
assistance, defend Katanga against the Congolese government and the United 
Nations signalled the end of confidence in CAF politicians to dictate regional 
politics. There were too many contradictions in the overlapping of racial and 
Cold War politics. However, the common belief in South Africa and Southern 
Rhodesia that the UN’s intervention was part of an American attack on whites 
in Southern Africa persisted. Therefore it can be argued that the Congo 
crisis helped to push Southern Rhodesia and South Africa closer together, as 
expressed in Taswell’s often hyperbolic praise of Welensky’s Katanga strategy. 
While the Congo crisis helped to further divide racial politics in Southern 
Rhodesia, contemporary readings of Dag Hammarskjöld’s death were 
not necessarily divided along racial lines. African leaders and newspaper 
editors viewed his death as a tragic loss and blamed Welensky for creating 
the political situation leading to his death. But a popular feeling persisted, 
and was encouraged by the messages from nationalist leaders, that the 
Secretary-General and the UN were doing the bidding of the Americans and 
Western nations, which continued to insinuate blame on the UN for Patrice 
Lumumba’s death. As an example, on 7 October 1961 – the day before a major 
riot in Salisbury – the African press reported on a NDP rally in Bulawayo 
where ‘One of the speakers, Mr K. Ncube was booed when he called for a 
minute silence for the late Secretary-General of the United Nations’ (Central 
African Daily News 1961e). The rhetorical logic of Zimbabwean nationalism, 
to the extent that it was increasingly defined in relation to imperialism, did 
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not allow Hammarskjöld’s contribution to be understood outside of the racial 
imperialism trope that dominated the conflict in Southern Rhodesia.
The NDP’s publication Radar had promoted this ‘common sense’ view in 
December of 1960, a month before Lumumba’s assassination:
When Africans invited the United Nations to come to the rescue 
of a Belgian-betrayed Congo, they never intended to introduce 
cold war politics into Africa. Africans have learnt now the folly 
of entrusting the freedom of a country to an organisation that is 
controlled by one big imperialistic country. … Conflicting interests 
plus the unwillingness of the Western Block to follow out policies 
that will free the Congo have been responsible for the deadlock 
at the United Nations. In Africa all trouble comes from conspired 
and planned subversion of African States by one or other of the 
Western Alliance (Radar 1960:8).
While nationalist leaders expressed their condolences for Hammarskjöld 
and blamed his death on Welensky and others who supported Tshombe with 
weapons and mercenaries, it was not clear at the time of Hammarskjöld’s 
death that Tshombe and Katanga had in fact been completely defeated. 
If Tshombe, with Welensky’s assistance, could renegotiate his role in the 
central government, the Katanga lobby would have succeeded in their goal of 
keeping the mining interests of Katanga, Northern Rhodesia, and Southern 
Rhodesia under their continued control. The lesson from the Katanga conflict 
for Zimbabwean nationalists was to keep future Tshombes from coming to 
power. It was better to deal with them beforehand. This would be the strategy 
Mugabe and ZANU would use moving forward, and after 10 years in prison 
and detention, this helps to explain Robert Mugabe’s and ZANU’s advantage 
over other Zimbabwean nationalists starting in the mid-1970s. This Cold War 
lesson seriously limited the room for political moderation in nationalist circles, 
leaving a destructive legacy in post-independence Zimbabwe. The other lesson 
learnt from the Congo crisis, and Zimbabwean nationalists’ unsuccessful 
appeals to the UN Security Council for intervention, was that a fighting force – 
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even a small one with 300 odd white mercenaries and one fighter plane as in 
the case of Katanga – was an absolute necessity in order to be taken seriously 
by Cold War interests and, not insignificantly, by the United Nations.
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